ABSTRACT. A generic model for the monetary flow in multi-level marketing schemes for virtual goods, so called incentive management systems, is introduced and analysed. It is shown that such schemes can in principle be fair, and it is argued that they can be viably realised if the value of the distributed good is positive. It is shown how the monetary incentive a buyer receives through the scheme can be precisely determined in a large scope by dynamical forward pricing.
INTRODUCTION
Virtual goods are digital goods which share the attributes of transferability and non-exclusiveness (non-rivalry) with public goods, and additionally are durable, i.e., show no wear out by usage or time [1] . Like with a private good, however, giving access to the marginal consumer may be costly, e.g., require additional server capacity. See [2] for the related concept of an information good. A profitable marketing of such goods is problematic due to free-rider phenomena and "piracy", a problem which is conventionally approached using copy protection measures and/or digital rights management (DRM) systems. These systems very generally speaking aim at restoring some of the features of private, physical goods, or otherwise control or restrict usage of the good. This practise, backed by WIPO treaties [3] and national copyright law in signatory states giving DRM techniques protected legal status, has aroused public controversy and an ongoing scientific discussion about its various fundamental [4, 5] and pragmatic problems [6] . Also, the general legitimacy of "draconian" DRM measures is doubtful in light of empirical findings on the effect of illegal file-sharing on record sales [7] , which seems negligible.
As an alternative way to market virtual goods, so called incentive management (IM) systems have recently emerged. They promise to yield a fair remuneration to the originator of the good, who may be identical with its creator or not, without necessitating copy protection or disruption of users' expectations on "fair" and "personal" uses. One of the first such systems, and one which is already in practical use is the so called Potato System [8, 9] . It is based on super distribution of the virtual good from buyer to buyer, whereby each buyer obtains, along with the good itself, the right to redistribute it on commission. Upon resale, she will obtain a share of the purchase price as and additional incentive.
The rationale behind this scheme is as obvious as appealing. Rather than to discourage illegal distribution of the good by more or less draconian and unpopular measures, the aim is to make legal distribution more attractive than "piracy", cf. [10] . Concurrently, the scheme purports to attribute a fair remuneration to the party from which the good originated, for instance the creator of a work of which the virtual good is an embodiment.
Attractive as it may be, the system has, at first sight, some similarity with pyramid sales schemes -a publicly discouraged enterprise, which is illegal under most jurisdictions. Thus the natural question emerges, whether IM systems based on super distribution on commission, we call them multi-level IM systems for short, are a tenable approach to the general economical problems associated with virtual goods. This is tantamount to answering the question: Can multi-level IM systems be fair? Here, fairness shall be understood in a game-theoretical sense which is amenable to mathematical analysis, leaving societal and policy aspects out of the scope of the present paper. In practice, the question is whether multi-level IM falls in the economical category of legitimate multi-level marketing (also referred to as direct, or network sales), or of illegal pyramid schemes [11] . While we will not enter into the rather involved legal ramifications of this issue, the mathematical analysis below will yield some quantitative arguments and criteria for the assessment of multi-level IM systems.
Let us lay out some of the heuristic arguments brought forward to the defence of multi-level IM, to be able to see to what extent they are corroborated or not by our later analysis. The key point is that a buyer acquires not only a void right to resale, but with it a good of positive value, meaning that potential losses he will incur when he enters the market too late, i.e., too close to saturation to obtain significant resales revenues, can be partially alleviated by the good's value. A second characteristic of multi-level IM operating with virtual rather than physical goods is that the marginal cost for its replication, as well as the transaction cost for its resale, are negligible. In particular, this is in opposition to one of the main traits of pyramid schemes, namely that the reseller is required to keep a large, non-returnable storage of the good (termed inventory loading [12] ). Thus, the value of the good -and this can only be the value that buyers ascribe to the good, as opposed to the price they paid for it -is central to the question of fairness of multi-level IM. This is, of course, a practical problem and warrants a separate discussion. Yet clearly, if the good's value is close to zero, then the scheme is not fair or legitimate anymore but resembles very much a pure Ponzi scheme or "Peter-and-Paul" scam.
The other main aim of our work is a more precise qualification of the term "incentive" in incentive management. This comprises two aspects. First and foremost, we answer precisely the question which agents are rewarded by the scheme, i.e., receive an actual pecuniary incentive in addition to the valued good. For other agents this incentive, consisting in the expected resale revenues diminished by the buying price, can become negative but still be smaller in absolute value than the value of the good, and those agents would still be considered as being treated fairly. A systematical unfairness is consequently inherent in the multi-level IM system, if there are agents whose expected incentive is negative and too large in absolute value to be compensated by the value of the good. To design a viable and publicly acceptable multi-level IM system, the latter situation is the only one to be avoided, and our analysis provides some theoretical tools to achieve this.
A secondary meaning conventionally attributed to the term incentive, is that the incentive can be used by the agent who places it as a means to eventually meet some ends. The primary one is to maximise the revenues for the originator of the good through his share of the commissions, and this contains the secondary sub-goal of promoting the distribution of the good, i.e., maximising the market penetration. The latter facet has many interesting ramifications in dynamic market models, in particular there is a relationship to network effects and their potential influencing using multi-level IM. In particular, we take a closer look at the possibility to use multi-level IM to influence the dynamic evolution of a buyer market.
Since the present one is essentially a model for the monetary flow in multilevel markets, its scope is not restricted to such schemes for information goods. Rather, it can be seen as a very general formalisation of arbitrary multi-level markets.
The model for the monetary flow in multi-level IM is presented in Section 2, and the central results about its global properties are derived in Section 3. Section 4 looks at some realistic refinements of the basic model, while Section 5 examines the relation of the present continuous to a discrete model of a market. In order to make contact with dynamical market models, it is necessary to examine the relationship between multi-level IM and network effects, which is done in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 contains a general assessment of multilevel IM based on the previous analysis, its fairness and potential viability, and gives some directions to further research and applications of the present results.
THE MODEL
The model we devise in this and analyse in the next section is continuous and kinematic in nature. That means firstly, that we describe all pertinent quantities by variables with continuous range. Secondly, the model describes essentially the monetary flux between the market players, and other relevant quantities, such as the expected sales revenue, are to be derived from the kinematics.
About the market players we make no special assumptions, in particular with regard to game-theoretical features, for instance their decision making process. That is, our model is neutral with respect to the detailed structure of the monopolist firm marketing the good (which we called its originator), and the consumer buying it. Thus the agents are a uniform lot, solely discriminated by the time t at which they enter the market, where entering the market means nothing else but buying the good form another agent already present in the market. Consequently, buying the good happens only once for each agent, while resale can happen to arbitrary amounts at subsequent times. The market in turn is an even play field, i.e., all agents have equal probability to trade with each other. In accordance, we assume no special market dynamics by letting the number n(t) of agents in the market at time t be an unspecified function with continuous, non-negative, finite or infinite range. We denote by π(t) the resales price at time t and by v G the value ascribed to the good, both of which are also taken to be equal for all agents.
Then the monetary incentive v i for an agent entering the market at time t is given by v i (t) = v r (t) − π(t), that is, the expected revenue v r from resales to agents entering the market at later times, diminished by the price at which the good was bought, i.e., the resales price at time t. To calculate v r , we note that the influx of agents into the market is given byṅ(t ′ ) = dn(t ′ )/dt ′ at any later time t ′ > t, and if the agent was alone then one could integrate π(t ′ )ṅ(t ′ ) over an interval to obtain the resale revenue accumulated in it. But since there is competition in the reseller market, and all n(t ′ ) agents have equal probability to strike a deal with the newcomers, the integrand must be divided by n(t ′ ). Thus we arrive at
One simple transformation, namely reparametrisation by the monotonously increasing number of agents n(t), can immediately be made to make the independence of the market dynamics manifest. We arrive at
in which the market size n ∞ may be finite or infinite. The reader will have noticed that this model for the monetary flow in multilevel IM is too simple to cater for some desired realistic aspects. In particular, we neglected transaction costs and the commission paid to the originator of the good, which means that we treat the market as a closed system in this first approach. We will comment in Section 4 on ways to augment the model in the noted directions without affecting the general analysis in Section 3.
As for the generality of the model presented, its crudeness becomes a virtue if the main interest lies in answering global questions, such as that of fairness, for which the individual characteristics of agents do not matter and should be averaged out in any case. From the viewpoint of econometrics, we neither specify all the endogenous and exogenous factors that may contribute to a comprehensive model of incentive markets, nor do we presume any special estimators for them. Accordingly, the fundamental price function π, as well as the market dynamics, is left completely unspecified and can be generated by any underlying mechanism without affecting any general result derived from the model. It can for instance happen in realistic instances of the model, that π is an external variable, e.g., set by the operator of the IM system. This is the case if an authority which uses control over, or at least some influence on the resale price as an essential means to control the incentive and thereby the market.
The above is true in an extreme form for instance in the Potato system, where π is held constant. Since the latter system was part of the motivation for our study of multi-level IM, we briefly comment on the relationship of the present model to this system. The Potato system discriminates not only between agents entering at different times but also between the different generations, i.e., levels of buyers. For instance, the commission of the first-level buyers receive from second-level buyers is shared evenly between them and the originator of the good, while second-level buyers receive only a smaller share since the price third-level buyers pay is divided between the originator, the first-level buyer from which they received the good, and themselves. Although this scheme cannot directly mapped into our model, it is conceivable that an appropriate averaging, e.g., over the temporal distribution of market entrances for the different buyer generations, will yield a fitting approximation for which the general results derived below hold.
ANALYSIS
It is instructive to attempt to solve the homogeneous equation v i = 0, corresponding to an expected balance between resales revenues and buying price for all agents. In this case, π would necessarily have to satisfy the differential
the unique solution of which is π(n) = π(0)/n. With this solution however, we obtain v i = −π(0)/n ∞ , showing that this π is not a solution of the homogeneous equation for n ∞ < ∞. The same reasoning applies to any constant, nonzero v i , i.e., a nontrivial incentive which does not discriminate between the market players. We conclude that such a situation is not realisable in a finite market, due to the singular nature of the integral operator defining v i . We now specialise to finite markets, i.e., we take n ∞ < ∞. Then we can again apply a nonsingular re-parametrisation in replacing n with the market saturation s = n/n ∞ , 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. We therefore consider the integral operator K : π −→ v i , a Volterra operator of the second kind, defined by
As this operator describes a closed market, one would expect it to satisfy a conservation law. In the present case this law takes the form of a game-theoretical zero-sum condition.
Proposition 3.1 (Zero-Sum Condition). If π is bounded then
If π(s) is bounded on [0, 1] as assumed then the second term is of order O(ε ln ε) and therefore vanishes as ε ց 0. The first term converges to
as desired.
The zero-sum condition expresses that wins and losses in incentive compensate each other exactly. It is also the main reason why the attempt to obtain a nontrivial solution to the homogeneous equation was bound to fail (notice that π = π(0)/n is too singular at 0 to fall in the scope of Proposition 3.1).
For regular enough π, the inverse of K is easily obtained as a solution of the inhomogeneous equation Kπ = v i . We denote the derivatives of π, v i , withπ, v i , respectively. 
Proposition 3.2. K maps
On the other hand, ifv i = O(1/σ) (σ → 0), then the last calculation showed thatǨ can be applied to it and obtains a differentiable function in (0, 1) which extends continuously to [0, 1]. That isǨv i ∈ V and we calculate for s > 0
In the last step, we used continuity of v i at 1. Now, since
, the limit can be assumed and yields
where the zero-sum condition has been used.
Although nothing in principle prevents a forward monetary flow from earlier market entrants to later ones by negative prices π < 0, we would here like to restrict attention to the conventional case of positive resale prices. According to the inversion formula in Proposition 3.2, it is sufficient thatv is non-positive for π to remain non-negative, that is positive (non-negative) prices are always obtained if the incentive is (strictly) monotonic decreasing. This is however only a sufficient condition, and the sharp, necessary and sufficient one reads as follows.
]). Then, π is positive if and only if
Proof. Partial integration yields
where we have used that σv i (σ) → 0 for σ ց 0 if π is C 1 , cf. Proposition 3.2. The result follows upon inserting the above equation into the inequality π(s) > 0 and using Proposition 3.2. This result has a rather direct interpretation. It says that the monetary flow is always directed backwards if and only if the expected incentive at a certain time is smaller than the average expected incentive before that time. Figure 1 shows three characteristic examples of positive prices and associated incentives. We now discuss them in mathematical and economical terms.
On the left hand side, we see that as expected, the case of a constant price π ∼ = 1 is associated with a strong favoritism of early buyers, who receive an additional monetary incentive and the good for free up to a market saturation of approximately 40%. This is certainly the most basic example besides a linearly increasing price, e.g., π = s which is associated with a linear decrease of incentive v i = 1 − 2s. In both cases, later market entrants are increasingly penalised up to the last buyer whose incentive is just the negative price −1, showing that this pricing is fair only if v G ≥ 1. The example also exhibits a logarithmic singularity at s = 0, which will always emerge if π(0) is positive due to the singularity of order −1 of the kernel defining K. This is of course not realistic but has to be considered as an artifact of the continuous model as opposed to a more realistic discrete one. We will analyse this discretisation error in more detail in Section 5 and for the time being consider two other examples in which π approaches zero as s ց 0 and consequently v i stays bounded at zero.
The centre picture in Figure 1 is, like a linearly increasing price, typical for what is conventionally termed an early subscriber discount. In real markets this is often used as a means to spur the distribution of the good in an early stage of market development, i.e., to counteract a slow startup effect of the distribution market. Without discussing this kind of dynamic network effects at this point, which is deferred to Section 6 we can still see that early buyers receive a positive incentive corroborating these heuristic arguments. However, the dynamic pricing associated with this incentive is monotonous increasing, yielding a double penalty to later buyers who pay ever more and steadily receive less incentive. Buyers who enter this market for some reason at late times will notice that they essentially "pay the rent" for quicker adopters, and possibly tend to become frustrated. thus the fairness condition that v G be greater than minus v i (1) becomes yet more important in this case. This leads to interesting ramifications outside the scope of this paper, e.g., the question whether the perceived value of the good is constant, decreasing (like for topical news), or even increasing (wine, although not a virtual good before consumption, being the paradigm).
The third example in Figure 1 improves on the second one by letting the price vanish when the market reaches saturation. The incentive associated with π, which is here a pure sine, is given by (Kπ)(s) = Si π − Si πs − sin πs, where Si is the integral sine function. This v i combines a discount for early subscribers with a rebate for very late ones who finally obtain the good gratuitously. This pricing can therefore potentially used to spur the distribution of the good in early market phases through low price and high incentive, as well as at late phases, when the good itself might have lost in value and the market looses dynamics. If we assume that the good's market has a positive growth dynamics in an intermediate phase, associated with a high demand and maybe a higher perceived v G , then it is also reasonable to let the prices peak and lower the incentive during this phase, as the example shows. Clearly, deepness and position of the minimum of v i can be adjusted almost arbitrarily. Apart from its pragmatic meaning, this example also shows a case where v i is not always monotonic decreasing and π is still positive.
For a pragmatic implementation of incentives based on our theoretical results, information on the market dynamics becomes essential for a central authority determining the price, in particular the current size n(t) of the market must be known. This is in fact the case in the real world example of the Potato system, where a central server counts every acquisition of the good by a new buyer. A second and much more difficult to determine variable is the absolute final market size n ∞ , necessary to calculate the saturation s = n/n ∞ . Although one might try to estimate n ∞ by market research, comparison with earlier runs of the system for different goods, or other means of educated guessing, a more pragmatic solution suggests itself. Namely, as in the last example in Figure 1 , setting the price to zero after some finite time, respectively at an a priori given n ∞ obtains a natural condition for closure of the market. In doing so, it might well be that the last odd potential buyer does not contribute to the monetary flow, however the market structure becomes much clearer for the agents if they are informed about n(t), s, π(s), v i (s), an argument which seems to be important for the acceptance of real multilevel IM schemes.
4. REFINEMENTS 4.1. Transaction Costs. In the resale process, the buyer as well as the seller can incur transaction costs. We assume both of these additional costs to be constant and show how they can be incorporated in the model. While the buyer's transaction cost β ≥ 0 directly adds to the price π(s) and can therefore be absorbed in that function, the seller's transaction cost σ ≥ 0 modifies the integrand for the calculation of v r from π(s)/s to (π(s) − σ)/s. Upon integration, this yields a negative contribution in the incentive of the form
Commission.
In real multi-level incentive systems the market will be an open system as opposed to the closed one we considered up to now. In particular, the operator of the scheme, i.e., the entity from which the good originated and who might or might not be identical to the creator of the good, will want to draw a revenue out of the market. We call this entity, which functions as a collecting agency, the collector and assume, as is conventionally done, that a commission factor payable by the seller is imposed on resales. This diminishes the revenue of a single resale from π to γπ, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, and the modified operator K γ yielding the incentive v i,γ becomes
Its inverse for differentiable π can still be calculated as
For constant commission this reduces to
The amount of money v c,γ taken out of the market by the collector can be calculated, e.g., when π is bounded, as in Proposition 3.1 to obtain
as expected. Note that this quantity is still normalised and the gross commission collected is n ∞ v c,γ . The market with commission no longer satisfies the zero-sum condition but rather its analogue
balanced with the collector's share.
Market Exits.
In a realistic market, not all buyers will remain available as sources for resales for all times. Though this is not rational without further qualification, since an agent can always expect additional gains from staying in the market, at least if transaction costs are neglected, some agents might, for instance due to limited resources, drop out of the market at some exit time t e . This case can still be accommodated easily in our model. The variable s = n/n ∞ still denotes the number of market entrants and can be used to parametrise the system. Let n d (t) < n(t) be the number of agents that have dropped out of the market and denote their relative share by d = n d /n ∞ . An individual agent is now not only characterised by his time t of market entrance, but also by his exit time t e , corresponding to the exit saturation s e ≤ 1. We arrive at the modified expectation for this agent's incentive
with the relative coordinate δ def = (s − d)/s.
THE DISCRETE CASE
A continuous model is of course an idealisation of a more realistic market where buyers enter one by one, i.e., the market size evolves in discrete steps. On the one hand the idealisation is a valid one in the sense that the continuous model reproduces realistic features like the zero-sum condition Proposition 3.1 and the condition for positive prices Proposition 3.3. Yet, on the other hand the it also entails artifacts, most notably the logarithmic singularity for s ց 0 when π(0) > 0. Therefore we have to examine the discrepancy between the incentive obtained from the continuous model and the one calculated by discrete summation somewhat more closely.
For a constant price π(s) = π, the discrete model can be solved directly. Agents are labeled with k = 1, . . . , n ∞ , by the order of market entrance, and we obtain for the expected incentive v i of the discrete case
where the Digamma function Ψ(z) = Γ ′ (z)/Γ(z) is the logarithmic derivative of the Gamma function, see [14, p. 39] .
In the general case, we have to look at the difference between v i (s) and the discrete incentive v i (s · n ∞ ) at the corresponding point. 
Proposition 5.1. For bounded, non-negative π holds
where we extended π continuously in a small interval [1, 1+ε] , and used Dirac's δ-function to incorporate the sum in the integral. Now, the non-negative factor π can be drawn out to estimate
Using the asymptotic expansion of the Ψ function for r a positive integer, see [14, p. 295] , we obtain
where B 2m is the 2m-th Bernoulli number. From this, the claimed estimate follows easily.
We can conclude that the error behaviour of the continuous model is rather benign in that it decays with the inverse of the market size at any finite saturation s > 0. For fixed k = sn ∞ on the other hand, a constant error bounded by c k π max for some c k > 0, will always remain.
NETWORK EFFECTS
The incentive yielded by multilevel IM to individual agents can be used to further the distribution of a virtual good. In order to assess the usefulness of those schemes as distribution networks which has been considered above, the proper subject to examine is that of network effects [15] . In particular, the action of the incentive on the market has to be compared with other network effects beyond the level of the pure incentive. Those are generally understood in the economics literature as the benefit that accrues to a user of a good or a service because he or she is one of the many who use it. Simple functional forms of network effects for special types of networks, such as Sarnoff 's, Metcalfe's, and Reed's law, are often taken as heuristics to explain the dynamics of the growth of networks of the respective type. The most prominent phenomena traced back in this way to network effects are that of a "slow startup", the existence of a "critical mass" [16] , and strong (supra-exponential) growth after this mass has been reached. Models for network externalities and their effects on prices and utility are numerous and detailed, see, e.g., [17, 18] and references therein, while global models, such as [19] for the possible functional forms of network externalities, are scarce.
We want at this point to note only some elementary conclusions on the relationship between multi-level IM and network effects which can be drawn from our model. Our aim is to show that it is rather neutral with respect to these effects, and that the incentive introduces but a single, independent network externality on the market dynamics. Therefore, the model can be effectively combined with more refined models of market dynamics including network effects, to see how the incentive acts on the latter.
Network utility can spatially either be understood in a global sense as the aggregate value, summed over all members of the network, or as the local, individual value enjoyed by its single members. In our context, each case is in turn subdivided on the temporal axis into the dynamic utility given as a function of the saturation s, as a relative variable, and the kinematic utility, which is the scaling behaviour of the utility with the market size n ∞ .
The aggregate utilities are the simpler ones to discuss, since our model has no special properties that would yield nontrivial contributions to these quantities. In fact, the only kinematic aggregate utility that can directly be ascribed to the model is that obtained by the replication of the virtual good and distribution of it to the members of the network, a contribution which is always of order O(n ∞ ), like in broadcast networks. The incentive contributes to aggregate utilities only in a dynamic way, since it is given by
which approaches zero for s → 1 in the pure model due to the zero-sum condition, or something of the order O(−n ∞ ) (more precisely −n ∞ v c,γ ) if a commission is taken out of the market. The dynamic, individual utility of the network is the one that is directly affected by v i . If it is, within our model, the dominant contribution to individual utility then we can argue that the incentive can be used as an effective marketsteering instrument. In fact, in the continuous model there is no other relevant factor for individual utility, since the kinematic, individual utility, defined as the scaling behaviour of v i with n ∞ , is O(1) precisely if π is O(1) (n ∞ → ∞), i.e., if the price stays bounded as the market size grows. While this argument holds for large saturations, some care has to be taken for short times viz. low saturations. In the first place it might be that the continuous model introduces artifacts that lead to nontrivial scaling for small s = k/n ∞ , keeping k fixed while letting n ∞ grow. This is however excluded by the error bound obtained inProposition 5.1. The scale-free behaviour of the continuous model is therefore stable for nonzero s. For small, fixed k = sn ∞ , and if π(0) > 0 then the logarithmic singularity present in the continuous as well as the discrete model introduces a scaling of the order O(ln n ∞ ). This is in accordance with the conventional wisdom that in pyramid schemes the profiteers realise profits which scale logarithmically with the number of participants.
We conclude, that except for a rather moderate effect for very early subscribers, the model does not introduce any particular network externalities by itself, as was to be expected since the market it describes has no special structural properties.
DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK
With our basic model for multi-level IM presented in Section 2 we can answer global questions on such systems, as for instance whether they can be made fair for the average market player or not. The answer to this question is affirmative if and only if the value of the good distributed through the system is not negligible, and potential losses can be compensated by it. Moreover the zero-sum condition Proposition 3.1 shows that in practice, i.e., if the incentive function is bounded, the maximum incentive is limited by the value of the good times the relative proportion of "losers" (agents with negative v i ) over "winners" (agents with positive v i ). Therefore, the good's value determines the scope for the setting of the incentive.
The model reproduces many realistic features. In particular it yields a quantitative analogue to the heuristic that late entrants to the market are (like in pyramid schemes) penalised, and early adopters are mostly the winners. This is contained in Proposition 3.3, stating that an agent cannot expect to obtain more than the average agent who entered before him. For the latest market entrants this means that, since v r will always tend to zero as s approaches one, their incentive will always tend to a non-positive value, as follows from Proposition 3.3 together with Proposition 3.1. All this holds precisely if the monetary flow is only directed backwards, which is the essential meaning of a positive price, but the model points toward generalisations of multi-level IM with money flowing in both directions. Whether such a scheme could be of any real use, is worth a separate discussion.
An important difference between pyramid schemes operating with physical goods and multi-level IM is clarified through the analysis of transaction costs in Section 4.1. The negative contribution of sellers' transaction costs −σ ln s can hit early buyers very hard, since they have to process many resales. A particular case in the real world to which this finding corresponds is the detrimental effect of inventory loading in pyramid schemes. There [12] , resellers of the good incur extraordinarily high transaction costs by being required too keep a large stock of the goods, probably more than they could ever expect to sell. The penalty multiplies for early adopters who actually sell a portion of the goods and are required to reorder stock, which is then usually possible only in overly large lots. Virtual goods are much tamer in this respect. Stock keeping in itself is not an issue, since the goods are stored in digital form, allowing principally infinite, lossless replication. Costs for their replication and redistribution are, more often than not, orders of magnitude smaller than their value, even if they are embodied on a physical media like a CD, say, for transport. This is the key difference which makes multi-level IM of virtual goods more viable and acceptable in many cases than analogous multi-level marketing schemes for physical goods. In the Potato system for instance, the processing of resales, including accounting, billing, and charging is fully borne by the central server, for which a percentage of the price is assigned to the system [13] . That is, the transaction costs are absorbed in the commission factor and after a buyer has received his resale link from the system in a one-off transaction, the marginal costs for resales are close to zero.
The global question whether multi-level IM can be a viable business scheme is of game-theoretical nature. Is there another equilibrium for the potential buyers, except not to buy, in which case they neither win nor loose? This question becomes acute when multi-level IM aims to fully replace copy protection measures and conventional DRM. For instance the mentioned Potato system makes the good freely available without any technical protection. Then it is not a priori clear that IM can function at all, i.e., a market of positive size has a chance to emerge dynamically. Our model gives two answers to this issue. First, if we consider the case without commission and transaction costs, the zero-sum condition tells us that, globally, an agent partaking in the IM market is not worse off on average than one not doing so, and thus a market of any size n ∞ > 0 is in fact another equilibrium. Whether or not the market will dynamically evolve is another question that can only be discussed in terms of the evolution of the monetary incentive v i . Assume the agents to be rational and conservative in the sense that they would rather copy the good for free than entering the IM market in the absence of an additional payoff. Then, a necessary condition for the market to evolve is that there is an initial phase of positive duration, always measured in the scale free parameter s, in which they can expect a positive pecuniary incentive, that is v i (s) > 0 for s < s 0 ,
This argument is still dubious when a good is freely available. Viewed from a different angle, the presence of the free version would negatively affect the value ascribed to the good v G in the IM market, and in turn the scope for the determination of the incentive. This is the classical dilemma for the marketing of digital goods and the one addressed by copy protection and DRM. To offer a pragmatical conjecture, it might even make sense to differentiate the freely available version of the good from the one distributed through the multi-level IM system, by adding some value and copy protection to the latter, though this would be a partial return to conventional DRM measures, maybe in the "softer" forms of watermarking, personalisation, and fingerprinting, to enable traceability of illegal copies [5] .
If all the above is enough to start a real IM market depends on many other factors. In particular, real agents will be only partly incentive-sensitive but also price-sensitive, both due to a lack of information about their possible incentive (limited market transparency) and of rationality. Other details to account for are transaction costs, non-constant v G (e.g. through changing demand), competition among a number of different goods, competition between different IM schemes, agents exiting the market, sense of community and reputation, network effects, and so on. It will certainly make sense to devise finer models of agents, markets and multi-level IM schemes based on our model, to investigate the market dynamics through simulations, i.e., in the framework of agent based computational economics [20] .
A central, new result is the possibility, via the inversion formulae of Sections 3 and 4.2, to dynamically fix the incentive during the evolution of the market. This could well be applied to the improvement of existing IM systems, or the design of new ones. We (re)collect a few elementary points that might be of importance for the practical implementation of such an multi-level IM system with dynamical forward pricing, and which can already be derived from the analysis of our general model.
1.
Fairness. In the design of the incentive function v i , the condition v i ≥ −v G must always be satisfied in order to ensure (average) fairness of the scheme for all buyers. 2. Elevation of v G . Since the fairness condition limits the scope in which the incentive can be predetermined, it becomes imperative to have v G as large as possible. As said, this is difficult given the pretence of pure IM systems to do completely without copy protection measures, and real systems would possibly be complemented by conventional DRM methods.
3. Initial invitation to enter. The market of a virtual good in a multilevel IM system is probably not a self-starter, in particular if the good is freely available or illegal copies are widely available, and therefore early buyers cannot be sure about their potential resales revenues (remember that v i (k = sn ∞ ) scales as ln n ∞ ). To compensate for this potential slow-startup of the IM market, the incentive should be designed to yield an actual pecuniary reward v i > 0 during an initial phase through, in effect, an early-subscriber discount. 4. Market observation. For a proper steering of the progression of the incentive, the variable n(t), and the parameter n ∞ are to be known to calculate the saturation s. While the former is rather simply obtained by a central authority in realistic implementations such as the Potato system, the latter poses a nontrivial problem. One pragmatic solution lies in 5. Market closure. Letting π approach zero at a predetermined market size n ∞ solves the last problem but runs somewhat counter to the aim of maximising the distribution of the good and, with that, the potential profit of its originator, as discussed in the end of Section 3. However, it would yield the additional benefit of effectively rewarding late buyers by a rebate on the good's value. Of course, this can make sense only when looking beyond the level of a single run if the IM system. Then, the possible frustration of late buyers who are not able to realise significant resales revenues might deter them from partaking in the IM market for the next good. On this psychological level it may be wise to treat this customer group with special care, e.g., by handing the good practically gratuitous to them. 6. Market transparency. Remaining finally in the realm of consumer psychology, a realistic agent will perhaps rest his decision to buy or not on a mixture of various utilities about which he knows, price and incentive being just two of them. In particular, for the functioning of IM it becomes necessary to decouple the agents' decisions from the price and bind it more strongly to the incentive. For that, a precondition is the proper information of the market about the expected incentive, that is, viable IM depends to some extent on market transparency. In principle, nothing speaks against publicising the pertinent information on s, v i (s), the current price π(s) being known to the buyers anyway. On the other hand, particularly the market size n ∞ is a potentially useful information for competitors of a given IM system, and should perhaps be held undisclosed.
We conclude with a caveat with respect to the validity domain of our model. The calculation of the average incentive that can be realised by an agent depends strongly on whether or not the underlying averaging makes sense. If the market is biased in the sense that there are groups of agents with systematically higher trading capacities than others, this assumption breaks down. Heuristically, considering only an average agent in a structureless market should be a good approximation if the number of potential participants is large and consists of a more or less homogeneous type of individuals, like a group with special personal preferences (e.g. musical). To what extent the market can be levelled by means of the IM system (by providing, e.g., equal communication capacities to all participants), shall be discussed separately.
